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Kavaljer Quality Focus

December 2025

Active Management with a Focus on Profitability, Stability, and Growth – Characteristics we refer to as Quality

Kavaljer Quality Focus is an equity fund that primarily invests in Swedish quality companies. Holdings in companies based in the Nordic region and the rest of Europe may also occur.


Characteristics that define a quality company include increasing revenue and profit over time, solid finances, and an experienced and competent management team and board of directors committed to creating shareholder value. Investments in quality companies reduce the risk of unpleasant surprises.


The fund is actively managed, and stock selection is based on fundamental analysis without consideration for the respective companies’ weight in any index. The focus is on identifying quality companies with strong growth prospects at an attractive valuation. The investment horizon is 3–5 years, and the portfolio is concentrated, consisting of 25–40 companies.


The objective is to deliver returns that outperform the Swedish stock market over time. As an investor, the fund offers you a unique combination of compelling large and small quality companies.


The fund is available through, among others, Avanza, Nordnet, and Savr, as well as banks and institutions that trade via MFEX and Allfunds.

Year in Review 2025

December was a strong month for equities, with the Stockholm Stock Exchange (OMXSGI-PI) rising by +2.3%, the small-cap index (CSXSR) by +0.3%, and the global index (Dow Jones World Index) by +0.9%.


The full year also developed positively, with the Stockholm Stock Exchange up +12.8%, the small-cap index +1.9%, and the global index +20.0%. The year’s outperformance of large caps compared with small caps was record-breaking, and a muted interest in small-cap funds has led to outflows that have pushed down share prices in already depressed small-cap stocks.


Perfectly fine for swimming against the current

Kavaljer Quality Focus developed reasonably well, though far from fantastically. After fees, the fund rose by 10.6%, i.e. 2 percentage points below the Stockholm Stock Exchange as a whole, but still almost 9 percentage points better than the small-cap index. Since small companies make up a large part of our primary hunting ground for existing and new holdings, it is fair to say that we have been swimming against the current during 2025.


Over a five-year horizon, the fund’s performance is +67%, compared with the Stockholm Stock Exchange at +58%, the small-cap index at +20%, and the global index at +55%.


Luck and themes win in the short term, but the right process wins in the long term


The book Fooled by Randomness by Nassim Nicholas Taleb discusses how we humans tend to mistake luck for skill and how we underestimate the role of randomness in our lives, particularly in the world of finance and business. The reason is that we often quickly and without reflection link outcomes to execution/process, i.e. that a good result must be due to good execution.


This makes it easy to look like a genius when you have been in the right place at the right time (think of the CEO of any e-commerce company during the pandemic). In short, whatever you did (execution/process) resulted in high growth and improved profitability (outcome).


The right place during 2025 has been large-cap stocks, defence-related companies, or why not “picks and shovels for AI”.


Just as easily, one can look foolish for having been in the right place (good execution/process) at the wrong time (the outcome was poor), at least over the evaluation period in question.


The wrong place during 2025 has been small-cap stocks, and in particular those small companies whose profitability and growth are currently weak.


The effect of a large number of investors, i.e. “the market”, having been in the “wrong place” is that the market concludes that it has actually “done” something wrong, i.e. that there was something wrong with the execution/process. The consequence is that the shares that have been “wrong” cause the companies behind them to be viewed as “bad”. The new “normal” P/E multiples for these companies have now been lowered as the companies are perceived to be of lower quality than previously assumed.


The same effect applies to the companies that have been in the right place at the right time. These companies are instead perceived as high quality, with expectations of continued high earnings growth forever.


The common denominator is that the trend is extrapolated, i.e. the current trend is assumed to be here to stay.  The effect is that investors who have “been wrong” eventually give up on their holdings, sell them, and then buy the “new” quality companies, i.e. the winning stocks. In reality, it is true that the current trend is here to stay – at least if you look at the very short term. Over the longer term, however, “reversion to the mean” is much more common, i.e. the belief that what applied during the ten years prior to this year will likely return. This tendency to extrapolate the current trend indefinitely is what creates “Mr. Market”, the term coined by Benjamin Graham (Warren Buffett’s teacher) to describe the market’s manic-depressive nature. Mr. Market is simply either manic and loves everything about a company/share, or depressive and hates everything about a company. For very brief periods, Mr. Market is neutral and thus “balanced” in his analysis.


The solution to not becoming part of the market’s psychosis is to learn to trust your own process – which is, however, not easy when the market (through falling share prices) tells you that you have been wrong.


Our strategy: finding and owning undervalued quality companies


Our strategy is to find and own undervalued, or at least reasonably valued, quality companies. Our primary definition of a quality company is “the ability to grow earnings per share over time”.


Our main way of assessing a company’s quality is to evaluate its financial history – and then assess whether anything fundamental has changed.


Why? Isn’t this very rigid?

We believe that financial history is the result of a multitude of underlying factors; corporate culture, ownership structure, moats, etc. So instead of only listening to a CEO (who is primarily a salesperson for the company’s story), we look at the numbers, which are most often the final verdict on how healthy a company really is.


“History seldom repeats itself, but it often rhymes” – Mark Twain


If the historical record indicates high quality, the follow-up question is whether anything fundamental has changed that would make the future worse. Of course, we also talk to and listen to management teams, but our point is not to be blindly swept along by a CEO’s enthusiasm about the future.



Bet on “more of the same” – because “turnarounds seldom turn”


In investing, it is easy to be tempted by stocks that have fallen sharply. The mantra is that “if they just do x and y”, the share should be worth many times today’s price. In short, a so-called turnaround is supposed to happen, and then one is richly rewarded.


Warren Buffett has said, “rule number one is don’t lose money, rule number two is never forget rule number one”. A cornerstone of this concept is not being tempted by the turnaround situations described above. The reason, according to Buffett, is simple: “turnarounds seldom turn”.


What Buffett, and we, prefer instead is to bet on “more of the same”, and that this will lead to good share price performance. That is, nothing special needs to happen and no major decisions need to be made; you simply want the company to keep grinding away in its current manner, and sooner or later this will pay off.



Price vs value

The mantra that the company should just keep grinding away in its current manner and that this should lead to strong share price performance is, of course, not a given. Everything depends on the price you pay for the company – since price (where the share trades) often differs from value (the sum of the company’s future cash flows discounted to today).


“Price is what you pay, value is what you get” – Warren Buffett

In cases where the aforementioned mantra applies, a good investment opportunity is often presented when the price does not look low at first glance – but this is about to change (e.g. Carasent in our portfolio).


It can also apply to companies that trade cheaply because the market has so far placed the company in a “too bad” category, i.e. equating the company with low-quality businesses despite the company having proven itself to be of higher quality (e.g. Svedbergs, Protector and FlatexDegiro in our portfolio a year ago, or Securitas today).


Sentiment shift in action – Svedbergs vs Inwido during 2025

A very telling example of sentiment shifts during 2025 is the comparison between Inwido and Svedbergs.


In our view, these companies are quite similar, with comparable cyclical exposure and both with strong financial histories. At the beginning of the year, however, the valuation gap was oddly large. Inwido had become a “darling” among funds and had gone from being a “boring and cyclical company” to a “compounder” or “serial acquirer”, and was considered to have a long period of strong, profitable growth ahead – trading at a P/E multiple above 20 on trailing numbers and P/E 16 on very optimistic 2025 estimates.


Svedbergs, on the other hand, was trading at around P/E 10 on reasonable or conservative 2025 estimates. We wrote in our February letter, “We believe that Svedbergs will, over time, move closer to companies like Inwido in terms of valuation, which is why we see continued strong upside.”


In hindsight, the outcome was even better than we had dared to hope for, with Svedbergs up +65% during the year, while Inwido is down -12% after having been as low as -25% just a month ago.


On trailing numbers today, Svedbergs trades at 18x earnings and Inwido at 17x. We now believe that expectations for Inwido have instead become too low, and have therefore repurchased the share and increased our holding around SEK 150. We have chosen to reduce our holding in Svedbergs, as we assess that the valuation is now more reasonable.


Largest holdings at the start of 2026 – Securitas & Carasent

Two of our three largest holdings as we enter 2026 are, on the surface and at first glance, very different. One appears to be a classic boring company that is unlikely to be a rocket, while the other appears, on the surface, to be an expensive hope-driven company. Below, we will go through why we believe these are simplified and incorrect perceptions, and which scenarios we believe will play out.



Carasent – Highest quality and explosive earnings growth ahead




We have written at length about Carasent in our monthly letters throughout the year. Our initial review can be found in the February letter (link).


Market-leading electronic health record systems for healthcare

Carasent provides cloud-based electronic health record (EHR) systems to private primary care providers – a business-critical product that is impossible to operate without. The company’s main EHR system is called WebDoc and is the dominant choice among customers. The main competitor, TakeCare, was strong around 10 years ago but has been continuously losing market share since shifting its strategy to “harvesting cash flows”, maintaining the system only minimally.


Attractive metrics and high predictability

Carasent has 92% recurring subscription revenues, only 2% customer churn, and a gross margin of 85%. Through price adjustments and expanded functionality, the company achieves a Net Retention Rate (NRR) of 110%, i.e. net growth of 10% from the customers it had one year ago. Total annual organic growth has recently been around 15%.


Impressive margin journey thanks to high scalability in the business model

The company has been cash-flow positive since Q3 2024. The EBITDAC margin (EBITDA–CAPEX) has improved from -33% in 2021 to +15% in Q3 2025. Since early 2023, the company has had a completely stable cost base (excluding personnel added through an acquisition), meaning that growth drops straight to the bottom line. Growth without materially increasing costs is also expected to continue going forward.


Several drivers for accelerated, scalable growth ahead

There are several pillars that should support accelerated growth going forward. Below are the most important growth drivers:


1. Expansion in Germany:

Through the acquisition of Data AL at the end of 2024, Carasent now has a platform in an enormous but fragmented market. Most competing systems are on-premise solutions from the 1990s. In addition, the software group CompuGroup has acquired around 30% of all competitors and immediately scrapped R&D in order to harvest cash flows from sluggish customers. In general, healthcare providers in Germany are very dissatisfied with their current systems, creating favourable conditions for Carasent to break in. In addition to significant potential for new customer acquisition (TAM of several billion SEK) through a superior product (competitors’ on-premise solutions from the 1980s/1990s), the company can double revenue per customer by migrating customers to its own cloud-based software without increasing customers’ total costs (as customers no longer need their own servers or expensive technicians). The company believes this market will become its largest within a few years, despite currently accounting for only around 12% of revenues.


Worth keeping in mind when reading the below is that Carasent today has revenues of approximately SEK 350 million and generally holds a dominant market position, which leads us to believe that the company can capture up to half of the market potential (TAM) in Sweden mentioned over time.


2. Launch of the surgery module: TAM of SEK 150 million with a product that is both better and cheaper than existing alternatives, all of which date back to the 1980s or 1990s. Paying customers since Q3 2025.


3. AI transcription: The company’s solution for automatic medical record documentation offers upselling potential of 50% compared with current revenue per user. A major efficiency gain for healthcare providers, which should lead to high adoption over time. TAM of approximately SEK 200 million.


4. Market tailwinds in Stockholm and VGR (key markets in Sweden): The phase-out of the current EHR system TakeCare in Stockholm opens up a TAM of SEK 350 million through 2030. Stockholm accounts for 25–30% of WebDoc’s revenues, despite the fact that double documentation is currently required if a healthcare centre wants to use WebDoc. Replacing TakeCare with Cosmic from Cambio enables simple (i.e. not double) documentation if a customer wants to use WebDoc. The barriers to switching to WebDoc are now decreasing with each passing year, as healthcare centres must replace their systems no later than 2030.


In VGR, the Millennium chaos has de facto become an opportunity rather than a risk after the regional executive board unanimously recommended abandoning the forced implementation of the Millennium system. This immediately opens up a TAM of SEK 25–50 million, as customers who previously waited to switch to Millennium can now finally move to WebDoc without risking having to switch again. Over the longer term, a much larger market of around SEK 100 million opens up through the new modular solution.


Accelerated growth drives explosive earnings growth

Already today, at around 15% organic revenue growth, profit margins (best measured as EBITDA–CAPEX, or EBITDAC) are scaling very well (from -33% in 2021 to around 10% in the 2025 guidance). Note that leasing costs are excluded above, which means approximately SEK 10 million in costs should be added, corresponding to just under 3 percentage points of margin.


We now see a period with “multiple shots on goal” that is likely to contribute to accelerated growth towards perhaps 20%. We also believe it is far from unreasonable that growth could become even stronger.


The company’s financial targets for 2028 are 15%+ growth and approximately a 28% EBITDAC margin. The CEO is, however, clear that the company’s internal targets are significantly higher. The fact that the CEO is notoriously conservative in communication (underpromise and overdeliver) strengthens our view that 15% annual growth should be seen as something of a floor for expectations. We instead believe in around 20% average annual growth and approximately a 34% EBITDAC margin. The company also has close to SEK 300 million in tax loss carryforwards, which means that free cash flow in the coming years should be around 85% of EBITDAC. This leads us to believe that the company could very well generate SEK 180 million in free cash flow in 2028.

Valuation does not reflect explosive earnings growth or company quality
By 2028, we believe the market will view Carasent as a company with the following characteristics:

Market leader with very high barriers to entry
Completely insensitive to the economic cycle
Long growth runway remaining with ~15% growth
Continued margin expansion

Given the above, we believe the market will value Carasent at around 30x free cash flow. Including the company’s net cash position (which is currently being used to aggressively repurchase shares), this should imply a share price of around SEK 80 by mid-2028. This can be compared with today’s share price of around SEK 27.

Carasent represents 4.6% of Kavaljer Quality Focus.


Fund Facts


Fund Type: SICAV (UCITS)

Name: LMM -  Kavaljer Quality Focus

Custodian: CACEIS Investor Services Bank S.A.

Auditor: PriceWaterhouseCoopers Société cooperative

Ongoing Charges (OCF): 1.59% per annum
Management fee: 1.25% per annum

Minimum investment: SEK 100

Subscription/Redemption: Daily

ISIN: LU1232457504 (SEK A)

Risk Level: 4 out of 7

Category: Equities, Sweden, small-/mid cap

AUM: SEK 811 millions

Morningstar Rating:  ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️


Are you interested in investing in Kavaljer Quality Focus?


Sweden: Available via several Swedish platforms and advisers.

Link: Kavaljer Quality Focus - Kavaljer


Norway: Available via Nordnet.

Link: Kavaljer Quality Focus - Nordnet (NO)


Luxembourg (via CACEIS): The fund is available as Lux Multimanager SICAV – Kavaljer Quality Focus (Class A SEK, ISIN: LU1232457504).

CACEIS, Luxembourg Branch acts as the Registrar & Transfer Agent, meaning subscriptions/redemptions are processed via CACEIS (typically through your bank/broker/distributor who can route orders to CACEIS).


Investors outside Sweden, Norway or Luxembourg: If you are based in another country and would like to invest, please contact us and we’ll help you find the most suitable way to access the fund via your local set-up.

Nacka Strand, January 9, 2026
Peter Lindvall, Håkan Telander, Jesper von Koch & Jakob Wahlberg

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Contact us:
info@kavaljer.se